This could have been written in our day.

These guys sound the same as the one's I remember.

Great Article...

...except for this quote.

"We'd seen how the Marines had to make do with old or insufficient gear, some of it dating to the Vietnam era."

Our Marines deserve better than this.

I retired in 1991 and we were not using anything that was from Vietnam., that had not been modernized.

He may be referring to our CH-46s, CH-53s and M16s. They have however all be updated

Reporter's Attitude Change

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER Sunday, 4 May 2003

REPORTER'S WAR ENDS WITH RELIEF, AND RESPECT FOR US TROOPS

By Ken Dilanian
Inquirer Staff Writer

My route out of Iraq felt like science fiction, like going through a time warp.

One minute I was at a pitch-black airfield in Kurdistan, where as the wind blew cold, soldiers huddled in tents, and ate monotonous fare from brown pouches. A jet ride later I was in Frankfurt, Germany, wolfing down a sumptuous breakfast at the Hotel Intercontinental, fresh from a long hot shower.

Relief flowed over me: My days of deprivation were over. But as I sat with two CNN reporters wolfing down the first fresh meal we'd eaten in a month, I thought about the paratroopers I had left behind, the men who had taken me into their confidences during weeks of preparing for the war that, for them, never really came.

The soldiers of the 173d Airborne Brigade are still patrolling Kirkuk, keeping the peace, sleeping on the floor, and living out of their rucksacks.

You don't hear much about them anymore, now that those of us reporters who were with them have come home - now that Iraq has begun to fade as a news story. After parachuting into northern Iraq a month ago with great fanfare, they have been all but forgotten, along with thousands of other U.S. soldiers, not only in Iraq but in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Korea, and a dozen other dangerous places across the globe. Forgotten by all but the loved ones they have left behind.

But I can't forget them. I keep thinking of them even as I prepare for my approaching wedding, which was the reason I had to leave them in the first place.

I think of how they climbed on the back of exposed flatbed trucks and rushed over a ridge into what they were told would be an onslaught of Iraqi fire - only to find that the Iraqi troops had melted away and Kirkuk had fallen without their help.

And how they never complained, even when they had to spend a freezing night in the open with no warm clothing. Even when they went without food for 24 hours.

And how they opened up to a stranger who was thrust into their ranks - told me their stories, lent me their equipment, and offered their protection.

The post-mortems are starting to come in on how the "embedding" of journalists shaped the coverage of this war. Most observers agree that, whatever else it accomplished, embedding was a public relations coup for the Pentagon, because the reporters bonded and empathized with the troops they covered.

Whether that empathy compromised our objectivity is for others to decide. I personally don't think it did. Our affinity was for the troops, not for their bureaucracy or the policies that sent them there.

But as a reporter who had no prior experience with the military, I came away with a profound respect for the professionalism and ingenuity of American soldiers.

And, as someone who has spent most of his career covering politics and government, I returned asking myself why the rest of the public sector can't be made to work one-tenth as well as the military does.

The answer is obvious, I guess: Once a soldier has enlisted, the military all but owns him and can impose its training and discipline on him the way no other employer can. That's how 19-year-olds from all walks of life become elite paratroopers who can jump out of planes, gather up their equipment, and build an airfield in the middle of nowhere in a week.

You can't expect that kind of performance out of, say, public employees at Philadelphia City Hall, even though most of them earn vastly more than soldiers and live far better. Still, I'll have a hard time listening the next time to a unionized bureaucrat grousing about his working conditions without thinking of the paratroopers - most of whom make less than $20,000 a year - whose bathroom facilities consisted of a ditch: no shower, no soap, no privacy.

What impressed me the most about these men and women was the way they laughed off hardship, embraced it, conquered it.

I still shudder when I think of the night we were caught without our gear and had to sleep outside next to an oil field in Kirkuk. The temperature dropped into the 30s, and none of us had jackets or sleeping bags or anything else warm.

I was the only one who groused. The soldiers just chuckled and told me they'd endured far worse in training in Germany. It was the same way they had laughed about having parachuted into a foot of mud, mud so thick and heavy that they spent the night digging one another out.

A few days earlier, we were standing on a sunny field north of Kirkuk, believing we were heading into battle.

"Ken, are you really, like, going with us?" asked one of the medics. "Cool!"

Then Capt. Eric Baus, of Collingswood, N.J., the Able Company commander, took me aside.

Don't do anything stupid to put yourself in harm's way, he said, because these kids won't hesitate to risk themselves to save you.

It was all moot: Ours was a war without combat. After enduring weeks of unimaginable destruction delivered from B-52 bombers, the Iraqi troops in the north took off their uniforms and blended into the countryside. When we crested the ridge, all we saw were abandoned gun emplacements. Uniforms and helmets were strewn on the ground.

"I feel like I've been stood up at the prom," lamented Spec. Brian Gaudette, 20, of Eugene, Ore.

The paratroopers became peacekeepers, and for the most part they performed admirably. Baus, for one, helped find the engineers who were needed to turn the water and power back on in Kirkuk. A week after I left, the news broke that troops from the 173d had arrested Turkish special forces troops trying to enter Kirkuk.

I heard Col. William Mayville, the brigade commander, whom I had interviewed a dozen times, speaking to a radio reporter with characteristic bravado.

"I caught 'em," he said.

I wished I was back there with them.

This piece appeared in Sunday's Philadelphia Inquirer. What a change in attitude. Whoever thought up putting reporters with front line units is a genius. I'm sure there were many fears about things going wrong. But exposing the troops to the press could only be a good thing, they were able to see that in spite of everything thrown at them, the guys did a great job.

I heard a reporter say " I saw incompetant officers, those who lost their temper under pressure. But I mostly saw professionalism, skill and calm. I wondered how I would have done in the same circumstances. And even the incompetents were trying. I've been reporting on the military for 20 years and I learned things I never knew. I'll never look on the military in the same way."

What struck me is the way the kids accepted outsiders and took care of them. That is if the outsider truly accepted the same conditions as the troops. I noticed the same thing in Vietnam as well as the incredulity when the guys found out that if I told Boeing I wanted out, I'd be gone in 48 hours. They say they'd be out of there but I don't think they'd leave their buddies.

Who's idea was EMBEDDING

Following are extracts from "Digital Journalist" which details the evolution of the policy on "Embedding". It seems that the idea came from Virginia Clarke but it is clear, reading between the lines that Donald Rumsfeld's support and encouragement was extremely important if not vital, especially his willingness to let the chips fall where they may.

Extract from “Digital Journalist” May 2003
Assessing the Embeds
by Dirck Halstead

>>>Earlier this year the press and the Pentagon tried to come up with a new plan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who has been a friend of many photographers, decided to take a chance and simply allowing the press to accompany the troops, letting the chips fall where they may. There were, however, a few caveats. The Pentagon would decide to which units the press would be assigned, and most importantly, once a reporter or photographer was embedded, the assignment would last until the job was done. If an Embed decided to leave a unit, he or she could not return. There was to be no switch-outs, even for the likes of Ted Kopel, who distinguished himself by staying with his unit throughout the bumpy ride to Baghdad.

This was a wise choice. It gave the photographers a chance to become a "member of the family" with the units in which they were embedded. They got to know the men and women they were covering, and shared the same discomforts and dangers.<<<

Extract from “Digital Journalist” May 2003
Putting the Media in Soldiers Shoes
by Susan B. Markisz

>>>>>In its official policy, posted on the Department of Defense website, The Pentagon acknowledged that “media coverage of future operations will to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead.” (www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030228.pdf)<<<<<

>>>>>In a telephone interview on May 6, Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and one of the co-authors of the plan, addressed the motivations for the embedded journalists plan. “As the potential for military action increased, there was a conflict on the horizon,” he said. “We were getting information from media managers and reporters that they wanted to cover alongside the troops, up close and personal and we needed to find a way to bridge that gap while protecting our position.”

One of the factors which ultimately motivated the Pentagon to allow embedded journalists was Saddam Hussein himself. “Our potential adversary was a practiced liar, who used deception to fool the world community and what he was up to. The question was how to mitigate,” said Whitman. “We believed by putting a trained observer in the field---which I think is the definition of a reporter---to report in near real time, we could counter some of the disinformation coming out of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.”<<<<<

>>>>>While the embedment process offered narrow coverage from a particular vantage point, it offered reporters the opportunity to develop close relationships with the troops and therefore the ability to report in depth from that position. “We are proud and confident in the professionalism and experience of our forces; how well-trained, equipped they are; and the dedication and care used to execute their duties to avoid collateral damage,” emphasized Whitman. “It was a good way to let Americans and the world community witness what our troops do. In our experience it is inescapable that after spending some time with our troops, reporters would see their professionalism and determination.”<<<<<

>>>>>Largely credited to Victoria Clarke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Bryan Whitman, and other service chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps units in the Pentagon, and approved by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.<<<<<

>>>>>For now, perhaps one of the greatest benefits of the embedding program has been an altered perception of the media by many in the Pentagon. “Although I’ve always viewed the media as hard-working,” said Whitman, “it gave many military members and commanders newfound respect for their dedication and willingness to assume risks and put their lives on the line.”<<<<<

13 journalists were killed in the war, out of 600, of which just over 60 saw combat.

Says it all

I was searching the web and came across the following post. I don't know who Texas Cowboy is but he sounds like one of us:

I stopped at a truck stop in South Texas yesterday.
As I was paying for a cup of coffee, I noticed behind the counter a full shelf of plates commemorating the Iraqi Freedom conflict, all with emblems of our military.
As I walked down the row I saw the Army, the Navy and the Air Force seals, but no Marine Corps.
I was a little pissed when I asked the clerk, "Where in the hell are the Marine Corps plates??"
She said, "Sorry, sir. We can't keep 'em in stock!"
True story, but I don't mean to turn this into a rivalry.
As y'all know, I love 'em all!
MAY GOD BLESS EACH AND EVERY ONE!

33 posted on 05/23/2003 6:59 PM PDT by TexasCowboy (COB1)

Interservice Competition

This article ran in the London Daily Telegraph. Keegan is a great fan of the USMC. There are a lot of mildly derisive stories that each side has about the other but they are insider ‘family’ stories. Insiders can tell them but outsiders had better not. The British Army likes serving with the USMC better than any other service. Something about shared values, 'always do what they say they will'. But it is best summed up for me by the US Navy Chief who told me, “If I can’t have a US Navy ship supporting me, I’ll take the Royal Navy over anyone else.”

Let the infighting begin: British and US rivalry resumes

By John Keegan, Defence Editor, Daily Telegraph, London

Now that the fighting is over, supporters of our soldiers are beginning to ask how the respective contingents did. The Americans captured Baghdad. Does that mean that the American army is better than the British?

War arouses highly competitive emotions, between allies and also between armies and within armies. No doubt the American 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force are secretly contriving uncomplimentary remarks about each other at this very moment. Soldiers are like that. They quickly forget whatever hatred they had for the enemy. A rival organisation getting above itself, on the other hand, is not a matter to be forgotten lightly. There will already be British anti-American gibes, American anti-British gibes. What do they signify? Mainly, slight nuances of difference.

In fact, the two armies are quite like each other and the American Marine units are in some essential respects more like any British regiment than they are like an American army unit. Senior Marine non-commissioned officers, for example, are accorded the same respect and responsibility as their British equivalents; regimental spirit is similar and so is unit identity. Ask a US Marine to which unit he belongs and he will say "3rd Battalion, 1st Marines", for example, as automatically as a British soldier will say "2nd Greenjackets". Because battalions are small enough for all who belong to know each other, that sort of unit identity is crucial to combat performance. It makes Marine battalions very formidable indeed.

It is a mistake, however, to think that American Marine units are superior to American army units, in the way that they notably were during the Second World War. The American army is not only highly efficient, as British officers admiringly testify, it is also a terrifyingly effective fighting force. That has partly to do with its equipment, which is superior in every category to that of other armies. It has also to do with its personnel, who are highly motivated and well trained.

If the American and British armies do differ, it is most noticeable at the personal level.

British soldiers join the army for the military experience, which often runs in the family. They choose particular regiments, which have very great importance, usually because of a strong regional connection.

(The major reason for the difference in age is the British serviceman signs on for 21 years and has to apply to get out. The American serviceman joins for 4 years and has to apply to stay in. John)

American servicemen and women, by comparison, seem young. Though they have to be 18 to enlist, few have been away from home or outside their immediate home area. Some, particularly those from the South, a traditional recruiting ground, will have a military connection. It was noticeable that Private Jessica Lynch, from the very military state of West Virginia, has a brother in the army and a sister who wants to join.

Recent immigrants, however, another common group, usually lack a military connection. They see the service as a means of joining the American mainstream, a path blacks took in the 1950s with marked success. Enlistment provides work, particularly in regions where work is scarce. Overwhelmingly, however, the motive to join is to get an education. The government pays college tuition to former service people with four years of active duty. Jessica Lynch wants to be a teacher and joined up for that reason.

There is a marked cultural difference between American and British army officers (Marines much less so). The British notoriously exhibit an unhurried and amateur manner, while Americans are formal and conscious of rank. The British officer's tendency to wear odd clothes and use Christian names to other officers strikes Americans as unserious.

The differences, however, do not run as deep as might seem. Officer training in both armies is intense and prolonged. Moreover, though the British may privately mock American earnestness, the sheer efficiency of everything the US army does has made its impression. The British are particularly impressed by American logistics, which deliver necessities where and when required, and their mastery of advanced equipment.

Despite their similarities, the armies will probably each bring away from the action a fund of stories that emphasise their differences and do each other discredit. Most will be quite harmless and for internal consumption only. Soldiers preen themselves by running others down. It is a very human instinct.

Fundamentally, Americans and British know they are on the same side.

John Keegan's latest article

It is sadly ironic that I posted John Keegan's earlier article about the 'in' stories the Brits and Americans tell about each other the day before 6 British 'Toms' were killed in Iraq. The Brits were crowing about how much better they were than the "Yanks" at policing and 'hearts and minds' operations. They especially were derisive about Americans still wearing full combat gear. They aren't crowing now.

Give them their due, the talk in the UK is "Maybe the Yanks are right. We should at least re-examine our procedures."

By the way, to the Brits, all Americans are "Yanks", no matter where in the US they are from. In the same way that in the old South, if you are not from there you are a Yankee even if you are from Liverpool, England and fresh off the boat. (This from personal experience)

DAILY TELEGRAPH, LONDON. 26 June 2003

Getting out of a war is always harder than getting into one
By John Keegan

The two attacks on British troops in Iraq on Tuesday, one of which resulted in six deaths, announced that the occupation of the country has taken a nastier turn. They may presage more deaths. They certainly warned that British self-congratulation on the success of its occupation policies was optimistic.

It has become a catchphrase of American strategic policy that starting wars is easier than ending them. As the Pentagon puts it, the real difficulty is not war initiation but war termination, and the discovery of an "exit strategy".

The US armed forces came to this view because of their experience in Vietnam, where extricating half a million troops from the conflict proved almost as difficult as fighting the seven-year war.

The problem of war termination is comparatively new to Western states. Traditionally, wars between sovereign governments were ended by the victory of one over the other, which had to surrender and accept a peace settlement. Armies obeyed their respective political authorities, while populations usually lacked the weapons to sustain the struggle even if they wished to do so.

The first notable alteration of this arrangement came in 1870, when the French people refused to acquiesce in the defeat of their army by the Prussians and, after the flight of the discredited Napoleon III, armed themselves out of the government's arsenals and continued the struggle.

The people's war of 1870-71 was an isolated incident - though it helped to explain the harshness of German occupation policies during both the First and Second World Wars. The Germans were outraged by French popular resistance, which they denounced as illegal, and used to justify their policies of reprisal and deportation both in 1914 and after 1940.

The obverse of German repression of popular resistance to defeat in the field was German acquiescence in surrender. Both in 1918 and in 1945, the defeated Germans accepted the verdict of battle, disbanded and returned home as soon as armistice or surrender terms were signed. There was no resistance, but rather a swift return to civil order, in 1945, under the occupation forces of the conquerors.

Both British and Americans accepted this outcome as the norm. Outside Europe, however, it had rarely been the case. Wars of empire, even if apparently ended by outright conquest, all too often resulted in protracted post-war strife.

The Americans found themselves involved in pacification operations in the ex-Spanish empire, both in the Philippines and the Caribbean, for years after their victory of 1898. For the British Army, pacification in the colonies became a way of life, in India, Africa and the ex-Ottoman empire year after year.

That was particularly the case in ex-Ottoman Iraq after 1918. Then, as now, Iraq was a region of distinct ethnicities - Kurds, Sunni and Shia Arabs - each of which sought self-rule. The propertied class, particularly among the Sunni, resented the imposition of foreign government, all the more under a Hashemite king who had no historic link with his new domain.

There was a revolt in 1920, which required the deployment of three divisions, almost the size of the current occupation force, and resulted in 2,000 British casualties.

The British solution to Iraqi disorder was twofold. First, London experimented with a policy of "air control", using the RAF to bomb dissident tribesmen into obedience. Second, it created an internal security force drawn from the Iraqi minorities, a conscious policy of "divide and rule".

The Iraq Levies, set up in 1922, consisted of separate units of Marsh Arabs from the south, Kurds from the north and Assyrians. The Assyrians, refugees from Turkey, were a Christian people without friends. They were detested by the Turks as rebels and disliked by all local Muslims because of their religion. They nevertheless made excellent soldiers and, under British officers, maintained the peace.

Meanwhile, the British were also creating a native Iraqi army, largely recruited from Arabs who had served in the old Ottoman army. After 1930, when Iraq became nominally independent, it assumed responsibility both for external and internal defence.

Nevertheless, the levies remained in being and were used by the British to sustain their authority in the country, notably in 1941 when Iraqi army officers attempted to arrange an alliance with Hitler.

Post-Ottoman Iraq has never been an easy country to govern. Only under Saddam, who sustained his tyranny by terror, has rule from Baghdad been country-wide. Even so, both the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs gave him frequent trouble.

The current situation therefore perpetuates a pattern that has persisted since 1918. What is remarkable is that, so far, there have been so few casualties among the Anglo-American forces. It has been complacent of the British to believe that their relaxed method of internal policing would spare them losses.

True, the British are good at internal security and are experienced in that role. That is not a guarantee, however, that the Iraqis will love them. Whitehall, Westminster and the Ministry of Defence should have taken more account of history. The Iraqis have twice rebelled against British involvement in their domestic affairs, in 1920 and 1941. There was no reason to suppose that they would not do so again.

What is now needed is that "exit strategy". It cannot be found either in the previous British experiments with "air control" or "divide and rule". For one thing, there are no Assyrians left. The whole community emigrated to America 50 years ago.

A better solution is that of recreating an Iraqi national army, as the British did in the 1920s. There is plenty of raw material - the 200,000 unemployed soldiers at present not under orders and only erratically paid. Their discontent is fuelling the disorder.

It must be a matter of priority to enlist as many as possible, give them Western training and use them to replace the American and British soldiers patrolling the cities and countryside. That programme will take several years until it is completed. Casualties among the Western occupation forces will, meanwhile, continue.