Part of this is off another web site. :confused:

Mean time between aborts was every 25 hours rather than the 17 hours required by the USMC. However, they decided that this measure is no longer important. Keep in mind these are new aircraft maintained by the best the Corps has.

Mission Capable rate, 82% required after 60,000 hours. Test results, 78-88% after around 751 hours for eight MV-22s. They mean 83%, but that would show a failure. Okay, 751 divided by eight new V-22 aircraft means each flew around 62.5 hours each. A little short of 60,000. I wonder what the rate will be after 1000 hours?

Also note the V-22 elite maintenance team of Marines was augmented by extra and mysterious contractor experts called the "Fleet Support Team", not something V-22 squadrons in the fleet will have.

Deck heating and shipboard power compatibility were "discovered" during OPEVAL? They have been tested from ship several times, they knew about these problems and did nothing as they have no solution.

How can new seats solve the cabin congestion problem, they won't make the cabin bigger? It is 25% smaller than the CH-46.

They admit the V-22 cannot autorotate to a safe landing. However, can it land safely vertically with one engine? No testing was done. It was never done with helos since they can land safely with no engine power.

The say a defensive gun is a future "Block B" requirement. The Commandant of the Marine Corps publicly told them he wanted a gun back 1999. Why have they refused to mount one? Does it add too much weight? Does the recoil crack the flooring or airframe?

As suspected, they did OPEVAL with flight restrictions on maneuverability, something the pilots noted.

They say infra-red signature is less because the engines are "displaced" from the nacelles? What? They are in the nacelles.

They recommend "assess realistic tactical approaches to landing zones" What? Didn't they do "realistic" ops during the OPEVAL.

Yes, where is the personnel hoist? This isn't rocket science. Is it missing to reduce weight?

They admit there is no way to repair the composite fuselage should someone shoot a few holes in one. Actually, they vaguely say it will take forever.

They often note the V-22 can self-deploy overseas, but that has never been demonstrated, not even during OPEVAL.

They only flew 33 of the planned 131 test hours at night? It sounds like they were afraid of testing. This is the most important testing in years for a multi-billion program and the USS Bataan was too "busy" to stay a sea a few more days. What about the Bogue Field, a landing pad near Cherry Point with an LHA ship outline. Couldn't they at least do some night testing there?

They didn't do brownout testing because pilots couldn't find any loose sand. It was too wet near Nellis? Gee, let us fly to Yuma or China Lake and do the testing. No, lets go to Vegas and party.

Yes, the V-22 is twice the size of a CH-46E, so an LHA or LHD can only deploy with half as many.

They said they couldn't do electronic testing to simulate anti-air threats because China Lake has limited facilities. They were at Nellis, which has the best in the world. Why didn't they do it there?

So they demonstrated 7200 lb external lift to 85 miles. The KPP was a minimum of 10,000 lbs 50 nm and up to 3000 feet. Why wasn't this tested? Don't forget the V-22s tested are missing some 1000 lbs of empty weight in the form of a gun and hoist.

They keep comparing the V-22 to the CH-46, which is a 40 year old design restricted to half it payload due to age and is only half the size of a V-22 (empty weight). A CH-53E can move three time more and is smaller than a V-22 (empty weight).

They didn't note if the V-22s took off vertically for these payload test missions, like from a ship, or do a rolling STOL takeoff.

Page 11 is proof for a criminal indictment. They said aircraft carried 4760 lbs of ballast (e.g.sandbags) in lieu of 24 combat equipped Marines. Doing math, that is just 198 lbs per Marine. I weigh 215 lbs, and the typical Marine goes into combat with at least 40 lbs of weapons and gear, the M-16 itself is 10 lbs. I am not talking about the typical 70lbs load with the pack and all, just what a Marine would carry on a light assault mission. I would plan for 220 lbs per Marine, and that is with no safety margin. I'd plan 240 lbs per Marine to be safe.

TRAP, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel. So the V-22 rescued some personnel, what about the downed aircraft? A CH-53E can pick up a downed helo, can a V-22?

Page 12 has an error. The Marine Corps expects the V-22 to self-deploy using internal aux fuel tanks AND aerial refueling.

Also, the footnote on Page 12, the test director ended the use of ballast to simulate payloads because it was causing oil leaks. What?

So the requirement to fly 2100 miles in eight hours now becomes flying 1600 miles in a single day, overland too. But then the testers are told another aircraft, not part of their OPEVAL, demonstrated this, so it shows up in their report. Then they say that it wasn't really demonstrated either, it was done with "performance calculations". Then the end of page 13 repeats this error, the V-22 hasn't demonstrated this. Was this because it would have to fly for eight hours at 18,000 feet with an unpressurized cabin and cabin temp of 14 degree F, something a USAF study said was unsafe.

So it failed to execute the Eagle Claw tests because of the FAA? Then the Corps most critical program can't get support from a KC-130? Error. The CH-53E can air refuel and could accomplish that mission. In fact, the old RH-53D did that mission a long time ago. The problem was caused when a C-130 hit a helo at the landing field.

Yes, the V-22 with its big proprotors has a tough time with air refueling as the wake from the refueler bounces it around. Not a problem for helos.

On page 15 they admitted a failed KPP, only 6900lbs external amphib (e.g vertical take-off) rather than the 10,000 lbs threshold, and the goal was 15,000 lbs.

So page 15 chart notes the self-deploy KPP was not demonstrated, it was "extrapolated".

Who wrote this OPEVAL report, Bell-Boeing? I suspect that Bell mole in DOT&E wrote most of this crap.

Yes, cruise airspeed has become lower and lower. The KPP was once 275 knots, it is now 240 knots. Note this is an efficient aircraft altitude of 3000 feet AGL, normal helo ops are 300 AGL, which the USAF Riconni study showed the cruise speed to be less than 200 knots.

"the MV-22 is close by before it can be heard" Is this OPEVAL document a test study or a sales brochure?

Yes, a V-22 can approach an LZ faster, but then as it converts it nacelles, it can only descend at one-third the rate of a helo lest it enter VRS and flip over.

They note the V-22 will fly in fast and rapidly slow near the LZ, but most pilots must slow down to find the LZ. An unfamiliar LZ is just a blur from above.

Page 17. Tell the ships' air boss you want to self taxi your V-22 on the flight deck, he will tell you to shut the fuck up.

The last V-22 OPEVAL focused on the hundreds of hydraulic leaks. This reports mentions none, and doesn't say how frequent they occurred. It just noted the current configuration is "safe."

This OPEVAL is full of hearsay. It constantly reports what the contractors told them was done before OPEVAL. An OPEVAL report should only address what it OPEVALed. Otherwise, it implies these hearsay claims were verified by DoD testers.

So now when they address downwash, they don't compare it to the CH-46 but the CH-53E.

I've been on a lot of helo assaults with a dozen aircraft. Why didn't they put all eight V-22s into a formation and touch down in an "austere LZ", is there any other kind?. The most they tried was two. Is it because the heavy downwash from nearby V-22s cause others to wobble?

They did admit that Block B with a gun, hoist and wing fuel tanks will have an even worse payload ability than the A block, which failed the KPP all by itself. Keep in mind that other modern medium lift helos can pick up twice as much as the V-22, even though their empty weight is half as much. The V-22s payload is even less than the new CH-60Ms "light" helo.

Page 29. Intermediate repairs that can be performed by Marine Aviation Log Squadrons are only allowed for 90 of 590 V-22 parts. So they can't be fixed in theater, they must go back to the Cherry Point depot. This is bad. Extremely expensive.

Page 31 is funny. The engine heat causes the ships; flightdeck to buckle, do they mean melt? The V-22s engines blow hear directly into the deck, whereas helos blow them sideways. Those Harrier pilots are in for a surprise when they STOL away and hit one of those V-22 speed bumps.

Page 32 is funny as well. They state the V-22 engines cannot be worked on in the hangar deck, but only topside, and only when the weather is nice and there are no flight ops. That is a program killer right there.

They didn't address the problem of V-22s see-sawing on deck, which was noted as very dangerous back in 1999. This was solved by only operating V-22 from ships during nice weather. Hence,the problems conducting tests aboard the Bataan. Weather was probably poor. so the program claims they can't find night qualified pilots, and the Bataan must go home.

Page 35 contains an outright lie. Its says the V-22s procedure for a single engine failure is to convert to the airplane mode, fly to a suitable landing site, and then convert back to the helo mode. That is false, something one can find in a Rotorhead article with chief test pilot Tom MacDonald. The procedure is to conduct a rolling landing. Attempting to land vertically with one engine out will result in serious damage.

Then more BS, saying a V-22 can handle a single engine failure better than "legacy" helicopters. Legacy is a Bell-Boeing sales pitch. Well a "legacy" helo can land safely with no engine power using autorotation, so why can't they do that with one engine.

Then more BS, the V-22 HAS experienced two engine failures, both on the flight deck when all the oil leaked out.

Finally, it describes how to safely land with one engine out and a interconnecting drive shaft failure. If that occurs, the V-22 will snap roll so fast it will probably roll a few times before hitting the deck.

Page 40, another lie. The V-22s 240 knot cruise speed is at 3000 feet AGL. If it wishes to avoid enemy anti-aircraft systems, it must fly 300 feet AGL like helos, which will limit it to around 185 knots as it pushes thicker air.

So page 42 reveals they plan to use the hand-carried 7.62mm machine gun as an aircraft defensive gun system. Not even a rapid fire electric gun used by old Hueys in Vietnam. Forget that, just tell the crew chiefs to fire pistols to suppress enemy ground fire.

This reports admits much more testing is needed, so another OPEVAL is in order before okaying this for full-rate production. Of course that is BS, the V-22 has been in production for several years, putting out a dozen V-22s a year, there are some 50 in storage. It doesn't matter if it is okayed for "full" production, at the current cost of over $110 million a year, the Marines can fund any more anyway.

On a final note, the CH-53X program has been cancelled for a lack of funds. First it was a SLEP to start around 2002, then the V-22 sucked up so many funds they pushed the SLEP to 2008, then they decided it must be pushed further back so V-22s could get more funds. Then they decided the airframes would be so old after 2010 it was best to go with new builds. Then Congress and Bell-Boeing noted the Army was planning a new heavy lift helo around 2020, so they demanded a joint program. The Marines balked, as they have already started retiring the aging CH-53Es and none will be left by 2020. However, Bell-Boeing put their staff of ex-Marine aviator Generals on the idea, and Congress pulled CH-53X funding and approved the idea either a Boeing super V-22 or a Bell quad rotor (two V-22s stuck end on end) . End result, the Marines will have no heavy lift by 2020.