December 7, 2008:
In the 1980s, the UH-60 began replacing the Vietnam era UH-1 "Huey" transport helicopter, while the AH-64 replaced the AH-1 helicopter gunship. Not only were these two new designs more effective, they were a lot safer, and expensive. By 2005, the U.S. Army had retired all of its UH-1s. The results of this shift were dramatic. The number of accidents went from over a thousand a year in the early 1990s, to less than 200 a year now. The accidents were more expensive, because the AH-64 and UH-60 were more expensive (costing more than three times as much.) But a lot of that money went into making the new choppers safer, and more survivable, for their crews, when they did get into trouble.
The new choppers are also safer, and sturdier, in combat. Since 2003, the United States has lost about 70 helicopters in Iraq. Most of them belonged to the U.S. Army, the rest were marine or civilian (mainly security contractors.) During the peak period of combat (2005-2007), helicopters were fired on about a hundred times a month, and about 17 percent of the time, the helicopters were hit. But few of the helicopters hit were brought down, much less destroyed. Contrast this with Vietnam (1966-71). There, 2,076 helicopters were lost to enemy fire (and 2,566 to non-combat losses). In Vietnam, helicopters flew 36 million sorties (over 20 million flight hours). In Vietnam, helicopters were about twice as likely to get brought down by enemy fire. As in Iraq, the main weapons doing this were machine-guns. Today's helicopters are more robust, partly because of Vietnam experience, and are more likely to stay in the air when hit, and land, rather than crash. The 1960s was also a period of learning how to use helicopters on a large scale, in a combat environment. That experience also went into developing safer ways to fly, and use, helicopters in combat.
For example, in Iraq, aircraft losses to ground fire have been declining every year, since 2003, mainly because of improved defensive tactics. Moreover, the most vulnerable aircraft, helicopters, have been spending more time in the air. In 2005, U.S. Army aircraft (mainly helicopters) flew 240,000 hours over Iraq. That increased to 334,000 hours last year, and went to over 400,000 hours in 2007. The more time helicopters are in the air, the more opportunities someone has to shoot at them.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20081207.aspx
Contrast this with Vietnam (1966-71). There, 2,076 helicopters were lost to enemy fire (and 2,566 to non-combat losses). In Vietnam, helicopters flew 36 million sorties (over 20 million flight hours). In Vietnam, helicopters were about twice as likely to get brought down by enemy fire. As in Iraq, the main weapons doing this were machine-guns. Today's helicopters are more robust, partly because of Vietnam experience, and are more likely to stay in the air when hit, and land, rather than crash. The 1960s was also a period of learning how to use helicopters on a large scale, in a combat environment. That experience also went into developing safer ways to fly, and use, helicopters in combat
Could that be because that we operated in "Hot" LZ's as a matter of course, and that in the sandbox they rarely do so?? Certainly NOT to take anything away from modern rotary wing buubas and bubbettes, they have to deal with more varied things than we did, but "Hot" zones isn't one of them, as I've been told. Are they more sturdy or are they seeing less of the automatic weapons fire that brought so many of us down??