For the Marines, whose equipment is being chewed up by the desert heat and sand, the “helicopter situation is dire,” say two defense analysts who have studied the effect of the war in Iraq on Marine Corps equipment and readiness.
The Corps has only 150 of the 160 CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters it needs, and may have to take another 15 out of service in 2010. Replacements aren’t expected to begin arriving before 2016, say Lawrence Korb and Max Bergmann of the Center for American Progress.
And the Corps’ CH-46Es, which average 46 years old, are wearing out faster than they can be replaced by MV-22s. The Corps plans to buy 360 MV-22s, but the problem-plagued tiltrotor aircraft won’t be in full production until the end of this decade, Korb said.
The Marines will almost certainly suffer a helicopter gap, he said.
To fill the gap, the Corps should buy “a couple hundred” H-60 helicopters flown by the Army or H-92 helicopters flown by the Air Force, and 10 to 20 heavy-lift helicopters, Korb said.
The MV-22 has been in development since 1983, and has “experienced significant technical and cost problems,” he said. The Marines have become “too dependent on a single airframe — the MV-22 — and now face critical shortages as a result.”
The war is also grinding down a wide range of other Marine Corps equipment, said Korb and Bergmann.
Forty percent of the Corps’ ground equipment and 50 percent of its communications gear is in Iraq, where it is being used up to nine times planned rates. To maintain readiness in Iraq, the Corps is taking equipment from non-deployed units and depleting prepositioned weapons and supplies, the pair said in a 25-page report issued Aug. 23.
The Marines need $6.8 billion for repairing and replacing war-damaged equipment in 2007, and should receive at least $5.3 billion for that purpose each year they remain in Iraq, the report says.
The experience in Iraq should also prompt the Marines to reconsider how much lighter and more mobile it really wants to be, Korb said.
“Tanks and armored personnel carriers have been out of favor with the advocates of military transformation for so long that their value and versatility in Iraq has come as something of a revelation,” the report says.
“Not only have they provided critical capabilities in waging urban battles, but they have proven surprisingly relevant in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.”
Iraq has demonstrated that heavy armor remains important, Korb said.
Thus, the Marines should consider buying Stryker armored vehicles that the Army now uses in addition to the Light Armored Vehicles that Marines now operate, Korb said. The Marines should also develop a plan for enhancement of its Abrams tanks, he said.
Overall, the Marine Corps needs more money, Korb said.
The Corps’ share of the Navy budget should increase from 14 percent to 17 percent. The Navy is asking Congress for $128.3 billion for 2007.
Rocky,
That report has been getting a surprising amount of coverage despite its poor research and glaring factual errors. Helps to have a co-author with a well-known name in defense circles, I guess.
The report suggests a big factual error -- the MV-22B Osprey (which is currently being fielded and should be ready for it's first deployment sometime next year) is NOT a replacement for the CH-53E Super Stallion heavy lift helicopter.
The MV-22B is replacing the CH-46E Sea Knight and the CH-53D Sea Stallion, which are both *medium* lift helicopters, as you all well know better than Mr. Korb and his co-authors.
For that matter, the Sikorsky H-92 -- the helicopter advocated by the report's authors to perform the heavy lift mission as a stop gap -- is also a medium lift platform, not a heavy lift platform. Nor is it, as the article you quote states, in operation by the Air Force (CSAR-X is a long way from being decided).
The CH-53E is being replaced by the CH-53K, which is scheduled to achieve its Initial Operation Capability in 2015. Until that time, we fully expect the '53E fleet to meet its operational commitments through innovative logistical efforts (such as the installation of an integrated mechanical diagnostic system, arc-fault circuit interrupter installations and a titanium nitride coating for T-64 engine compressor blades that dramatically improves engine life span), reactivation of stored aircraft and the continued hard work of our Fleet maintainers.
The report also states that we will be taking CH-53Es out of service, starting in 2010, due to fatigue life limits. That information is dated and is no longer the case. The Naval Air Systems Command recently initiated an airframe fix that will address the fatigue life issue of the transition bulkhead (the critical part of the tail boom that was formerly our life limiter). The fact is the '53E fleet is sustainable until the Kilo comes on line.
There is no doubt that the CH-53E is a critical battlefield asset. But equally important is understanding that there are no other helicopters in existence or planned (other than the CH-53K) that can perform the marinized vertical heavy lift mission -- this is a fact that has been conclusively stated by an independent, non-advocate Analysis of Alternatives. This AOA was conducted by Booze Allen Hamilton in 2003 and considered all possible existing airframes -- the MI-26, MV-22, H-60/H-92, EH-101 and CH-47. The MI-26 and the CH-47 are too big and lack marinization features (needed to operate aboard ship) and the others simply lack lift capability.
To think the H-92 can perform the heavy lift mission simply ignores the realities/capabilities of the platforms themselves. And to think that any commercially available platform (if one existed) could be brought on line before the scheduled availability of either the MV-22 or the CH-53K ignores the reality of acquisition processes mandated by Federal procurement regulations as well as the Procurement Integrity Act.
As for buying or leasing (didn't the Air Force recently learn a hard lesson about that?) H-60's, the notion that "the Corps should buy 'a couple hundred' H-60 helicopters" seems to conveniently ignore reality. Buy them from who? Sikorsky? I've been to the plant in Stratford recently and they are in full production of '60's for the Navy, Army and several other customers -- adding in "a couple hundred" more is unrealistic in the near term. The Army? The Army has 'a couple hundred' '60's laying around? Even if we could buy them, Army-configured H-60's are not marinized (no blade and tail folding ability -- somewhat critical for ship-board operation) and are not equipped with the comm/nav suites needed by Marine Corps sea-based aircraft. Even the MH-60S, currently in production for the Navy, would need appreciable integration and avionics development to meet Marine Corps requirements. All of that takes time. And add to that time the time required to train a cadre of instructors to train Marine Corps HMLA and/or HMM pilots and maintainers how to operate and employ a new type/model/series and you quickly get to the point in the calendar where you will have flightlines full of MV-22Bs and UH-1Ys long before a Marine Corps H-60 ever hits the Fleet.
Rushing COT aircraft to the Fleet is a huge risk -- one that we are currently getting a lot of scrutiny on for another of our platforms, the VH-71. Apparently, Mr. Korb would like to have his cake and eat it, too.
So would I.
Thanks,
John
John C. Milliman
Marine Corps Helicopter Programs PAO
U.S. Naval Air Systems Command
Patuxent River, MD
John,
Sure glad that is squared away.
It does give me a sinking feeling when I read very questionable information. I hope I'm not just old and old fashioned.
Keep up the good work.
Wayne
Wayne Hazelbaker
Article was in Marine Corps Times
Just somthing to sell newspapers I guess. Politics, Politics, Politics.