The Marine helicopters brought supplies to the hill positions directly from Dong Ha, rather than from the combat base at Khe Sanh, itself. This reduced the number of times cargo handlers had to package and stage the supplies, as well as the amount of time the aircraft had to remain airborne in the hazardous environment around Khe Sanh. This system was not without problems of its own. One battalion commander complained that priority requests required up to five days for delivery, while routine resupply took 10 days. Further, carefully assembled loads, packaged to fulfill specific requests, sometimes arrived at the wrong position.6^

By mid-February, with the enemy shooting down on a single day three helicopters attempting to reach the Khe Sanh hill outposts, Marine commanders realized that they had to take steps to remedy the situation. According to Major General Norman Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel William J. White, the commander of VMO-6, came to him and stated that the wing needed to work up a plan to keep the outposts resupplied. Anderson agreed and had White sit down with his operations staff to iron out the details. On 23 February, with the assistance of the assistant wing commander, Brigadier General Robert P. Keller, the small planning group, within a day drew up an operational resupply concept, later dubbed the "Super Gaggle.'164***

The idea was to establish a small task force consisting of 8 to 16 resupply CH-46 helicopters, about a dozen A-4 Skyhawks and four Huey gunships to fly cover, a Marine KC-130 to refuel the aircraft, and a TA-4F with a TAC (A) in the backseat to orchestrate the entire affair. The Khe Sanh DASC and FSCC insured the coordination of the air and ground fires. In

*Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, who as a major commanded HMM-362, a UH-34 squadron assigned to MAG-36, recalled that he kept several helicopters at Khe Sanh for three- or four-day periods during January and February, and would relieve them with replacement crews and aircraft: "During the siege there was of course no air-crafr maintenance support, only fuel. The . . . [aircraft] were parked in Khe Sanh's revetments, and the crews bunkered underground in the 26th Marines CP. We primarily engaged in emergency medevac, and emergency resupply of ammo and water, to the various adjacent Marine hillrop positions." LtCol Walter H. Shauer, Commenrs on draft, dtd lNov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Shauer Commenrs.

**Lieurenant General Carey, then serving on the 1st MAW G-3 staff, observed that helicopters were nor always able to use a "visual approach." According to Carey, the "skies were overcast more often than not." The helicopters flew on instrumenrs to Khe Sanh and then "let down through the overcast under conrrol of a TPQ or on a self-devised instrument approach on rhe Khe Sanh beacon. Once underneath they would pick up their fixed-wing escort. This operation required a great deal of coordinarion, generally conducted by an airborne TAC(A) in a TA4." Carey Comments.

***Gen Cushman, the III MAF commander, claimed to have conceived the idea for the "Super Gaggle." LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," dtd 23Mar69 (Vietnam Comment File). MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, however, credited Colonel Joel E. Bonner, Lieutenant Colonel William J. White, and LtCol Richard E. Carey, with the further commenr rhat Carey named rhe procedure. MajGen Keith B. McCurcheon, Comments on "The Battle for Khe Sanh," n.d. (Vietnam Comment File). This latter version appears to be in conformity with MajGen Anderson's recollections. MajGen Norman Anderson intvw, 3d Session, 17Mar81, pp. 225-6. Lieutenanr General William J. White noted in his comments that the MAG-36 group commander, Colonel Frank E. Wilson, was the one who decided that White should see the wing commander and accompanied him ro the meeting with General Anderson. LtGen William J, White, Comments on draft, dtd 10ct94 (Vietnam Comment File). In his comments, General Carey wrore; "it became apparenr that we had to do something fast. In discussion with Col Bonner and Gen Keller, Bill Whire and I suggested that we could come up with an answer. I was the considered authority on the fixed-wing participation and Bill provided the helicopter expertise. When all the details were sorted out I suggested the name super gaggle as that is a favorite fighter pilot term meaning, 'perceived confusion of the first order.'" Carey Comments,

Page 483 (1968: The Definitive Year)

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